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Salah Salimian; kiumars shahbazi; Jalil Badpeyma; Naeimeh Hozouri
Abstract
Appropriate decision-making in the firm’s location choice can play a crucial role in improving the competitiveness and profitability of the firms. The basic presumption of most existing location studies is the assumption of uniform distribution, which is less common in the real world. In contrast, ...
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Appropriate decision-making in the firm’s location choice can play a crucial role in improving the competitiveness and profitability of the firms. The basic presumption of most existing location studies is the assumption of uniform distribution, which is less common in the real world. In contrast, the distribution of consumers may be in the form of a triangle in which consumers gather in the city center. On the other hand, the type of consumers in terms of experienced and inexperienced consumers can also play an effective role in the demand for firm products. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the Hotelling location model with the assumption of a triangular distribution of consumers and experienced and inexperienced consumer types. In this study, optimal location has been analyzed assuming two types of experienced and inexperienced consumers, distributed with a triangular distribution density function. The results indicate that the demand functions of two firms depend on the acquired desirability of a particular type of food and the number of experienced consumers. The unit Nash equilibrium costs are increasing compared to transportation costs. In addition, with an increase in transportation costs, firm 1 approaches the center, and firm 2 gets away from it. Furthermore, if two firms are located at the same point, they do not demand uniform equilibrium prices, and the price of each firm is more sensitive to the location of the other first than its location.
Younes Brumand; Kiumars Shahbazi
Abstract
This paper focuses on strategic trade policy in the form of export subsidies in Cournot duopoly structure for differentiated goods. Export subsidies affect social welfare in both static and dynamic situations , and the aim of this paper is to analyze and compare the welfare effects of export subsidies ...
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This paper focuses on strategic trade policy in the form of export subsidies in Cournot duopoly structure for differentiated goods. Export subsidies affect social welfare in both static and dynamic situations , and the aim of this paper is to analyze and compare the welfare effects of export subsidies in one-period and multi-period games in differentiated goods markets. To analyze the welfare effects of export subsidies, a two-stage game of complete but inperfect information is considered. In the first stage, two governments determine the amount of export subsidies and in the second stage, two firms determine the product level. The results show that, given that the firms’ competitiveness do not differ so much, export subsidies by both governments increase the firms’ profits and decrease social welfare of both countries. In an infinitely repeated game with different discount factors for both countries, and by adopting trigger strategy, we create some conditions, in which both governments commit free trade. However, if the competitiveness of one firm is so greater than the other, free trade using trigger strategy is not stable and the country with more competitive firm has incentive to deviate.
Salah Salimian; kiumars shahbazi
Abstract
Utilization management of Persian Gulf oil and gas reserves is important, because of the importance of this area owing to the fact that it comprised 60% of the proven oil reserves and 40% of the proven gas reserves of the world and it determines the world's oil and gas strategies. By using game theory, ...
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Utilization management of Persian Gulf oil and gas reserves is important, because of the importance of this area owing to the fact that it comprised 60% of the proven oil reserves and 40% of the proven gas reserves of the world and it determines the world's oil and gas strategies. By using game theory, this paper seeks to achieve the best strategy that Iran could use in confronting other partners of common fields. Moreover, it seems to find the best approach for Iran and other countries in cooperation and non-cooperation conditions in extraction. The results showed that the higher the number of countries for a common resource, the less the attempt of each country would be; however, the more the total attempt of countries will be, which means more waste of attempt. Overall, partner countries in a resource are recommended to take actions to extract common resource via agreement and mutual cooperation; so that they could extract the same amount of common resources exercising less effort.
