ORIGINAL_ARTICLE
Gender and the Factors Affecting Child Labor in Iran: an Application of IV-TOBIT Model
In this paper we first intend to examine the probability of falling into the realm of child labor by using conditional probability theorem. Furthermore, we will compare the extent of each factor’s effect on boys and girls using a TOBIT regression model. Finally we will analyze aspects of Iran’s labor market to assess the future ahead of the children who work at present. As the results will show, the probability of not attending school conditional on being male is 0.081, whereas the same probability conditional on being female is 0.12. More probability scores are estimated in the paper. Moreover, the results from the TOBIT regression shows that in general boys are more affected than the girls by the same factors. Also, based on the macro statistics published by Iran’s Statistical Center, the graduation of numerous people from graduate schools combined with the low and slow rate of economic growth makes it quite difficult to find a decent work in the country. As a result, the skilled labor force will be content with accepting low wage jobs which are more suitable for the unskilled workers. Therefore, those who left school earlier in their lives will face several problems in the future.
https://ijes.shirazu.ac.ir/article_4545_5a5b7fc04e1d7436107f7e98377e4a11.pdf
2018-03-17
7
28
10.22099/ijes.2017.25423.1334
Child Labor
The Wealth Paradox
The Luxury Axiom
TOBIT models
Labor Market
Teimour
Mohammadi
atmahmadi@gmail.com
1
Faculty of Economics, Allame Tabatabaie University, Tehran, Iran.
LEAD_AUTHOR
Zahra
Karimi Moughari
zakarimi@umz.ac.ir
2
Department of Economics, Mazandaran University, Babolsar, Iran.
AUTHOR
Sahand
Ebrahimi Pourfaez
s.ebrahimi@stu.umz.ac.ir
3
Department of Economics, University of Mazandaran, Babolsar, Iran.
AUTHOR
References
1
Bandara, A., Dehejia, R., & Lavie, S. (2014). Impact of income and non-income shocks on child labor, Working Paper No 118. Retrieved from United Nations University: http://www.wider.unu.edu/
2
Basu, K., & Van, P. H. (1998). The economics of child labor. American Economic Review, 88(3), 412-427.
3
Beegle, K., Dehejia, R. H., & Gatti, R. (2006). Child labor and agricultural shocks. Journal of Development Economics, 81(1), 80-96.
4
Beegle, K., Dehejia, R., Gatti, R., & Krutikova, S. (2008). The consequences of child labor: Evidence from longitudinal data in rural Tanzania. Washington, DC: World Bank.
5
Bhalotra, S., & Heady, C. (2003). Child farm labor: The wealth paradox. The World Bank Economic Review, 17(2), 197-227.
6
Binswanger, H. P., & McIntire, J. (1987). Behavioral and material determinants of production relations in land-abundant tropical agriculture. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 36(1), 73-99.
7
Cain, M. (1982). Perspectives on family and fertility in developing countries. Population Studies, 36(2), 159-175.
8
Dillon, A. (2012). Child labor and schooling responses to production and health shocks in northern Mali. Journal of African economies, 22(2), 276-299.
9
Dumas, C. (2007). Why do parents make their children work? A test of the poverty hypothesis in rural areas of Burkina Faso. Oxford Economic Paper, 59(2), 301-329.
10
Dumas, C. (2013). Market imperfections and child labor. World Development, 42(1), 127-142.
11
Dumas, C. (2015). Shocks and child labor, Working Paper No 458. Retrieved from Université de Fribourg: http://doc.rero.ch/.
12
Duryea, S., Lam, D., & Levison, D. (2007). Effects of economic shocks on children's employment and schooling in Brazil. Journal of development economics, 84(1), 188-214.
13
Ebrahimi-Pourfaez, S. (2012). The Status of Decent Work Indicators among Chosen Developing Countries. Master’s Thesis. Faculty of Economics. University of Mazandaran.
14
Ersado, L. (2005). Child labor and schooling decisions in urban and rural areas: Comparative evidence from Nepal, Peru, and Zimbabwe. World Development, 33(3), 455-480.
15
Fan, C. S. (2011). The luxury axiom, the wealth paradox, and child labor. Journal of Economic Development, 36(3), 25-45.
16
Kambhampati, U. S., & Ranjan, R. (2006). Economic growth: A panacea for child labor? World Development, 34(3), 426-445.
17
Keshavarz-Haddad, G., & Borhani, F. (2012). Bargaining in the Family and Time Allocation of Spouses: Case Study of the Effects of Gender on Individual Labor Supply in Iran. Journal of Economics Studies, (4)47, 155 – 177 [In Persian].
18
Keshavarz-Haddad, G., Nazarpour, M., & Seifi-Kafshgari, M. (2014). Child Labor among Iranian Households. Economic Policies, University of Mofid, 7(26), 125 – 143 [In Persian].
19
Kruger, D. I. (2007). Coffee production effects on child labor and schooling in rural Brazil. Journal of Development Economics, 82(2), 448-463.
20
Landmann, A., & Frölich, M. (2015). Can health-insurance help prevent child labor? An impact evaluation from Pakistan. Journal of Health Economics, 39(1), 51-59.
21
Lima, L. R., Mesquita, S., & Wanamaker, M. (2015). Child labor and the wealth paradox: The role of altruistic parents. Economics Letters, 130(1), 80-82.
22
Morduch, J. (1999). Between the state and the market: Can informal insurance patch the safety net? The World Bank Research Observer, 14(2), 187-207.
23
Pörtner, C. C. (2001). Children as insurance. Journal of Population Economics, 14(1), 119-136.
24
Ranjan, P. (2001). Credit constraints and the phenomenon of child labor. Journal of Development Economics, 64(1), 81-102.
25
Ravallion, M., & Chaudhuri, S. (1997). Risk and insurance in village India: Comment. Econometrica, 65(1), 171-184.
26
Tobin, J. (1958). Estimation of relationships for limited dependent variables. Econometrica, 26(1), 24-36.
27
Townsend, R. M. (1994). Risk and insurance in village India. Econometrica, 62(3), 539-591.
28
Zeldes, S. P. (1989). Consumption and liquidity constraints: An empirical investigation. The Journal of Political Economy, 97(2), 305-346.
29
ORIGINAL_ARTICLE
Inflation Behavior in Top Sukuk Issuing Countries: Using a Bayesian Log-linear Model
This paper focused on developing a model to study the effect of sukuk issuance on the inflation rate in top sukuk issuing Islamic economies at 2014. For this purpose, as the available sample size is small, a Bayesian approach to regression model is used which contains key supply and demand side factors in addition to the outstanding sukuk volume as potential determinants of inflation rate. In the suggested model, inflation rate variable shows an apparent right skewness and the efficiency of log transformation for this variable is confirmed via Box-Cox approach. To give Bayesian estimators of the regression parameters, we have implemented an MCMC approach including 100,000 iterations in the WinBUGS software. The results show that sukuk volume is a significant determinant of inflation in selected Islamic countries, but only in the well-developed capital market economies its increase could decline the rate of inflation and so sukuk could be used as a policy instrument for controlling inflation. Also the Bayesian estimation of the other parameters shows that increase of money growth and exchange rate growth lead to higher inflation rates.
https://ijes.shirazu.ac.ir/article_4532_409a6b6faa16b376b889474fba0f3fae.pdf
2017-03-16
29
46
10.22099/ijes.2017.23169.1284
Sukuk
Inflation Rate
Bayesian Approach
Islamic Finance
Log-Linear Regression
Hasan
Kiaee
kiaee@isu.ac.ir
1
Faculty of Islamic Studies and Economics, Imam Sadiq University, Tehran, Iran.
LEAD_AUTHOR
References
1
Ayuniyyah Q., Beik I. S., & Arsyianti L. D. (2013). Dynamic analysis of islamic bank and monetary instrument towards real output and inflation in Indonesia. Proceeding of Sharia Economics Conference, Hannover, Germany, 154-162.
2
Box, G. E. P. , & Cox, D. R. (1964). An analysis of transformations (with discussion). Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B, 26, 211–252.
3
Campillo, M., & Miron, J. A. (1997). Why Does Inflation Differ across Countries?, A selected paper in: Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy, University of Chicago Press, 335 - 362.
4
Damian, M. (2012). The impact of financial crisis upon the inflationary process in Romania. International Journal of Business and Social Science, 3(10), 267-274.
5
Eftekhari-Mahabadi, S. , & Kiaee, H. (2015). Determinants of inflation in selected countries, Journal of Money and Economy, 10(2), 113-143.
6
Friedman, M. (1963). Inflation: Causes and Consequences, Asia Publishing House, New York.
7
Gilks, W. R., Richardson, D. B., & Spiegelhalter, D. J. (1996). Markov Chain Monte Carlo in Practice. London: Chapman & Hall.
8
Hammermann, F., & Flanagan, M. (2007). What explains persistent inflation differentials across transition economies? Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Working Paper No. 1373, Germany.
9
Hasin, Z., & Majid M. S. (2011). The importance of the islamic banks in the monetary transmission mechanism in Malaysia. 8th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance, Center for Islamic Economics and Finance, Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies, Qatar Foundation.
10
Kandil, M., & Morsy, H. (2009). Determinants of inflation in GCC, IMF Working Paper, Middle East and Central Asia Department.
11
Mohanty, M. S., & Klau, M. (2001). What determines inflation in emerging market economies? BIS Papers 8.
12
Ntzoufras, I. (2009). Bayesian Modeling Using WinBUGS, John Wiley & Sons.
13
Sarwer M. S., Ramzan, M., & Ahmad W. (2013). Does islamic banking system contributes to economic development, Global Journal of Management and Business Research, 13 (2).
14
Shahzad, A., Ahmed, T., & Rehman, K. (2012). Islamic financial system: A system to defeat inflation, Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review, 2(2), 69-72.
15
Spiegelhalter, D. J., Thomas, A., Best, N. G., & Lunn, D. (2003). Win- BUGS User Manual, Version 1.4, MRC Biostatistics Unit, available at www.mrc-bsu.cam.ac.uk/bugs.
16
Stanton, J. (2001). Galton, Pearson, and the peas: A brief history of linear regression for statistics instructors. Journal of statistics Education, 9 (3), [online].
17
Zaman K., Ikram, W., & Ahmed, M. (2010). Impact of financial development on inflation: Evidence from Pakistan (1974-2007). Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences, 30(1), 31-44.
18
ORIGINAL_ARTICLE
The Exchange Rate Asymmetric Pass-Through to Import Price Index: The Case Study of Iran
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the asymmetric effects of exchangerate on Iranian import price index using quarterly time series data over the period 1990- 2011. For this purpose, positive and negative shocks of the exchange rate have been separated from each other using dummy variables and the effects of the size of the exchange rate shocks by determining a threshold.The empirical results indicate that the positive and negative shocks of the exchange rate both have positive and asymmetric effects on the import price index. The results show that the effects of negative shocks of the exchange rate on the imports price index is more than the positive shocks effect. In addition, the experimental findings of the research indicate that the effect of foreign exchange rate shocks size on the imports price is asymmetric and the effectiveness extent of smaller shocks is significantly more than that of bigger exchange rate shocks.Moreover, according to the results, the effects of positive and negative shocks based on the size of foreign exchange shocks (small & big) on the imports price is asymmetric and the results show that the effect of small negative shocks is more than big ones and also the effects of small positive shocks is more than big ones.
https://ijes.shirazu.ac.ir/article_4707_5d27e2f500c6b7220a483d007cbbc49d.pdf
2018-03-17
47
64
10.22099/ijes.2018.19977.1243
Exchange rate
Import Price Index
Asymmetric efects
Iran
Hossein
Asgharpour
asgharpourh@gmail.com
1
Department of Economics, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran.
AUTHOR
Elham
Vafaei
elham.vafaei@yahoo.com
2
Department of Economics, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran.
LEAD_AUTHOR
Hamed
Abdolmaleki
hamedab1986@gmail.com
3
Department of Economics, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran.
AUTHOR
References
1
Alvarez, R., Jaramillo, P., & Selaive, J. (2008). Exchange rate pass-through into import prices: The case of Chile. Working Paper, No.465, Central Bank of Chile.
2
Aron, J., Farrell, G., Muellbauer, J., & Sinclair, P. (2012). Exchange rate pass-through to import prices and monetary policy in South Africa. South African Reserve Bank Working Paper Research Department, WP/12/08.
3
Bandt, O. D., & Razafindrabe, T. (2014). Exchange rate pass-through to import prices in the Euro-area: A multi-currency investigation. International Economics, 138, 63–77.
4
Belke, A., Beckmann, J., & Verheyen, F. (2013). Exchange rate pass-through into German import prices–a disaggregated perspective. Conference Paper, Global Current Account Imbalances, No. F08-V1, German Economic Association.
5
Brun-Aguerre, R., Fuertes, A. M., & Phylaktis, K. (2012). Exchange rate pass-through into import prices revisited: What drives it? Journal of International Money and Finance, 31(4), 818-844.
6
Bussiere, M. (2007). Exchange rate pass-through to trade prices. The role of nonlinearities and asymmetries. ECB Working Paper, No. 822, Frankfurt, European Central Bank.
7
Byrne, J. P., Chavali, A. S., & Kontonikas, A. (2010). Exchange rate pass-through to import prices: Panel evidence from emerging market economies. Department of Economics, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK.
8
Campa, J. M., & Linda, S. G. (2005). Exchange rate pass-through to import prices. Review of Economics and Statistics, 87(4), 679-690.
9
Campa J. M., Gonzalez-Minguez, J. M., & Sebastia-Barriel, M. (2006). Non-linear adjustment of import prices in the European Union. Documentos de Trabajo No. 0635, Banco de Espana, www.bde.es/informes/be/ docs/dt0635e.pdf.
10
Choudhri, E. U., & Hakura, D. S. (2012). The exchange rate pass-through to import and export prices: The role of nominal rigidities and currency choice. IMF Working Paper Institute for Capacity Development, WP/12/226.
11
Delatte, A. L., & Antonia, L. V. (20120. Asymmetric exchange rate pass-through: Evidence from major countries. Journal of Macroeconomics, 34(3), 833–844.
12
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13
Enders, W. (2005). Applied Econometric Time Series. Iowa State University.
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Goldberg, P. 1995. Product differentiation and oligopoly in international markets: The case of the U.S. automobile industry. Econometrica, 64, 413-430.
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Kadiyali, V. (1997). Exchange rate pass-through for strategic pricing and advertising: An empirical analysis of the U.S. photographic film industry. Journal of International Economics, 43(3/4), 437-461.
16
Karoro, T. D., Aziakpono, M. J., & Cattaneo, N. (2009). Exchange rate pass-through to import prices in South Africa: Is there asymmetry? South African Journal of Economics, 77(3), 380–398.
17
Kilic, R. (2010). Exchange rate pass-through to import prices: Nonlinearity and exchange rate and inflationary regime. Department of Economics, Koch University, Rumeli FeneriYolu, Sarıyer, ˙Istanbul 34450 Turkey.
18
Lawrence, R. Z. (1990). U.S. current account adjustment: An appraisal. Brookings Paper on Economic Activity, 2, 343-382.
19
Lee, J. (2013). Exchange rate pass-through into export and import prices: A bounds testing analysis on the case of Korea. The Working Paper Seriespublishes original research of Bryant University faculty associated with the Center for Global and Regional Economic Studies, 2013-04.
20
Mann, C. (1986). Prices, profit margins, and exchange rates. Federal Reserve Bulletin, 72(6), 366-379
21
Mashhadi Mohammadi, H., Shakeri, A., & Mahmudzadeh, M. (2014). Effect of real exchange rate deviation on exports of steel industry in Iran. Journal of Economic Sciences, 8(28), 15-33 (in Persian).
22
Mozayani, A. H., & Yavari, K. (2015). The impact of currency fluctuations on trade sector of the country, Iranian Journal of Economic Research, 4(14), 89-107 (in Persian).
23
Mumtaz, H., Oomen, O., & Wang, J. (2006). Exchange rate pass-through into UK import prices, bank of England. Working Paper, No. 312, London.
24
Pedram, M., Shirinbakhsh, S., & Rezaei-Abyaneh, B. 2012. Investigating the asymmetric effects of exchange exchanges on the prices of exported goods, Journal of EconomicModeling Research. 9, 143-166 (in Persian).
25
Pollard, P. S., & Coughlin, C. C. (2004). Size matters: Asymmetric exchange rate pass-through at the industry level. University of Nottingham Research Paper 2004-13 and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper2003-029C.
26
Przystupa, J., & Wrobel, E. (2009). Asymmetry of the exchange rate pass-through: An exercise on the Polish data. University Library of Munich.
27
Rangasamy, L., & Farrell, G. N. (2002). Exchange rate pass-through and South African import prices. South African Reserve Bank Discussion Paper, No. DP/02/03.Pretoria: South African Reserve Bank.
28
Sameti, M., Khanzadi, A., & Yazdani, M. (2010). Investigating the hypothesis of asymmetric effects of exchange rate shocks on production and price levels (Case study of Iran), Journal of Money and Economics, 2(4), 35-57 (Persian).
29
Tekin, R., Baris, & Yazgan, M. E. (2009). Exchange rate pass-through in Turkish export and import prices. AppliedEconomics, 41, 2221-2228.
30
Webber, A. (2000). Newton’s gravity law and import prices in the Asia pacific. Japan and the World Economy, 12 (1), 71-87.
31
Wickremasinghe, G., & Silvapulle, P. 2004. Exchange rate pass-through to manufactured import prices: The case of Japan. International Trade, No. 0406006.
32
Xu, S., Zhang, H., & Atri, S. (2017). A comparative analysis of exchange rate pass-through in China, Euro zone and the U.S.: A vector error correction model. International Journal of Economics and Finance, 9(8), 51-65.
33
ORIGINAL_ARTICLE
Modelling and Experimental Testing of Asymmetric Information Problems in Lease and Hire Contracts (Based on Contract Theory)
This article aims to study lease and hiring contract in the Iranian-Islamic setting and analyze the asymmetric information problem in these contracts. For doing this, we study the characteristics of lease and hiring contracts in Iran (real world experimental characteristics that recognized in other studies), using library method, then we mathematically model different aspects of asymmetric information (hidden information and hidden action) using contract theory. The result of model indicates that there is a list of optimal contracts in any lease or hiring transactions that can solve asymmetric information problems (adverse selection and moral hazard) by satisfying the participation and incentive compatibility constraints. Finally in the experimental analyses we calculate the optimal contract with hypothetical parameters using lingo software and illustrate that the main models provided for every transactions is solvable and the optimal contracts are obtainable. Experimental contracts shows that the lessor has to set security deposits of tenant type θL lower than tenant type θH and set higher monthly rent for him in lease contracts, and principal has to set wage of tenant type θL lower than tenant type θH and set higher length of contract for him in hiring contracts to solve asymmetric information problems.
https://ijes.shirazu.ac.ir/article_4709_ea4dfafb25e35c7a50e723234c85fe24.pdf
2018-03-17
65
86
10.22099/ijes.2018.21842.1256
Lease
Hire Contract
Contract theory
Asymmetric Information
Morteza
Derakhshan
morteza.derakshan@yahoo.com
1
Department of Economics, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran.
LEAD_AUTHOR
MirHadi
Hosseini Kondelaji
m-hosseinikondelaji@araku.ac.ir
2
Department of Economics, Arak University, Arak, Iran.
AUTHOR
References
1
Akerlof, G.A. (1970). The market for "lemons": Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 235-251.
2
Benjamin, J. D., Lusht, K. M., & Shilling, J. D. (1998). What do rental contracts reveal about adverse selection and moral hazard in rental housing markets? Real Estate Economics, 26(2), 309-329.
3
Bolton, P., & and Dewatripont, M. (2005). Contract Theory, Cambridge and London: MIT University Press.
4
Borgers, T., Krahmer, D., & Strausz, R. (2015). An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design. Oxford University Press, USA.
5
Brousseau, E., Glachant J. M. (2002). The Economics of Contracts: Theory and Applications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6
Johnson, J. P., & Waldman, M. (2003). Leasing, lemons, and buybacks. The RAND Journal of Economics, 247-265.
7
Johnson, J. P., & Waldman, M. (2010). Leasing, lemons, and moral hazard. Journal of Law and Economics, 53(2), 307-328.
8
Laffont J. J., & Martimort, D. (2001). The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
9
Rasmusen, E. (2006). Game & Information: An Introduction to Game Theory, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.
10
Robberstad, B. (2005). Estimation of private and social time preferences for health in northern Tanzania. Social science & medicine, 61(7), 1597-1607.
11
Salanié, B. (2005). The Economics of Contracts: A Primer. MIT Press.
12
Shavell, S. (1979). On moral hazard & insurance. In Foundations of Insurance Economics pp. 280-301.
13
Stiglitz, J. E. (2006). Stability with growth: Macroeconomics, Liberalization and Development. Oxford University Press.
14
ORIGINAL_ARTICLE
Identifying the adopted Monetary Policy Rule by the Central Bank of Iran
It is obvious that an optimal policy should consider main dimensions of the phenomenon that can affect the transmission mechanism of that policy. In an open economy, it is expected that variables of the foreign sector play important role in its economic behavior. Therefore, it needs that any optimal policy in an open economy to design in such a way which involves changes in the foreign sector. Due to this fact, this paper aims at assessing the monetary policy of Central Bank of Iran to find that whether this policy takes a right way or not. To do so, a DSGE model along with MCMC criteria are employed.The main result indicates that the Central Bank decision on monetary policy follows McCallum rule without any respond to exchange rate shocks.
https://ijes.shirazu.ac.ir/article_4719_f9f5e1222489aeb665c7dd67b4cc19a5.pdf
2018-03-17
87
107
10.22099/ijes.2018.27577.1402
Monetary Policy
Exchange rate
Monetary rule
Open economy
Raha
Pourahmadi Haghighi
rpoorahmadi@gmail.com
1
Departement of Economics, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran.
LEAD_AUTHOR
Ebrahim
Hadian
ehadian@rose.shirazu.ac.ir
2
Departement of Economics, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran.
AUTHOR
Ahmad
Sadraei Javaheri
sadraei@shirazu.ac.ir
3
Departement of Economics, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran.
AUTHOR
Rouhollah
Shahnazi
rshanazi@rose.shirazu.ac.ir
4
Departement of Economics, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran.
AUTHOR
References
1
Calvo, G. (1983). Staggered Prices in a Utility Maximizing Framework, Journal of Monetary Economics, 12(3), 383-398.
2
Fakhr-Hosseini, S. F. (2011). The Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model of Monetary Business Cycle for Iran, Journal of Economic Modeling Research. 1(3), 1-28. [in Persian]
3
Fuhrer, J.C. (2000). Habit formation in consumption and its implication for monetary policy models, American Economic Review, 90, 367-390.
4
Gali, J, & Gertler, M. (1999). Inflation Dynamics: A Structural Econometric Analysis, 44(2), 195-222.
5
Gali, J, & Monacelli, T. (2005). Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Volatility in a Small Open Economy, Review of Economic Studies, 72, 707–734.
6
Khiyabani, Nasser & Amiri, Hussein. (2012). Designing, an open dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to investigate the effect of oil shocks on macroeconomic variables. Quantitative Economics 9 (3), 25-59 [in Persian].
7
Lucas, R. (1976). Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique, Rochester- Carnegie Conference on Monetary Policy. 1,19-46.
8
Mimir, Y, & Sunel, E. (2015). External Shocks, Banks and Optimal Monetary Policy in an Open Economy, BIS Working Paper, No. 528.
9
Walsh, C. (2010). Monetary Theory and Policy, Third edition, Boston, MIT Press.
10
Wollmershauser, Timo. (2006). Should central banks react to exchange rate movements? An analysis of the robustness of simple policy rules under exchange rate uncertainty, Journal of Macroeconomics, 28, 493- 519.
11
ORIGINAL_ARTICLE
Analysis of Electricity Generation’s Externalities on Sectorial Output Growth and Welfare in Iran
Environmental problems are one of the most challenging issues for the entire world and each country. In economic studies, environmental issues are analyzed as negative externalities. In this article, the negative externalities of electricity production on the output growth of different sectors and household’s welfare in Iran’s economy have been studied through price system using Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model empirically. In this regard, Iran’s Social Accounting Matrix of 2011 and GAMS software by introducing five scenarios related to environmental effects of electricity production have been used. The results show that firstly, the internalization of electricity production externalities reduces the output of agriculture and industry sectors in all scenarios, while the output of services will increase. Secondly, internalization of electricity production externalities increases total economy’s output and declines the household’s welfare.
https://ijes.shirazu.ac.ir/article_4721_dcbde07ffa8302c3c0b067437df4cadf.pdf
2018-03-17
109
127
10.22099/ijes.2018.27858.1416
Externalities
Electricity Production
Sectorial Output Growth
Welfare
CGE Model
Majid
Maddah
majid.maddah@semnan.ac.ir
1
Department of Economicss, Semnan University, Semnan, Iran.
AUTHOR
Mohammad Mehdi
Berijanian
mmberijanian@yahoo.com
2
Department of Economicss, Semnan University, Semnan, Iran.
LEAD_AUTHOR
Mohammad Sadegh
Ghazizadeh
ghazizadeh.ms@gmail.com
3
Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran.
AUTHOR
References
1
Akpan, G. E., & Akpan, U. F. (2012). Electricity consumption, carbon emissions and Economic Growth in Nigeria. International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, 2(4), 292-306.
2
Amadeh, H., Ghafari, A., & Farajzadeh, Z. (2015). Analysis of environmental and welfare effects of energy subsidy reform application of computable general equilibrium model. Iranian Energy Economics Research, 4(13), 33-62 [in Persian].
3
Asiae, M., Khiabani, N., & Mousavi, B. (2012). The Environmental Effects of the Omission of Energy Carriers Subsidies in Iranian Manufacturing Sector, Iranian Energy Economics Research, 1(4), 1-24 [in Persian].
4
Burfisher, M. E. (2011). Introduction to Computable General Equilibrium Models, Translated by Bazzazan, F., & Soleymani-Movahhed, F. Tehran, Iran: Nashreney (in Persian).
5
Carneiro, P., & Ferreira, P. (2012). The economic, environmental and strategic value of biomass. Renewable Energy, 44(C), 17-22.
6
Dadgar, Y. (2012). Public Sector Economics, Ghom, Iran: Mofid University Publishing [in Persian].
7
Farber, S. (1998). Undesirable facilities and property values: A summary of empirical studies, Ecological Economics, 24(1), 1-14.
8
Foley, D., Rezai, A., & Taylor, L. (2013). The social cost of carbon emissions: seven propositions, Economics Letters, 121(1), 90-97.
9
Hosoe, N., Gasawa, K., & Hashimoto, N. (2010). Textbook of Computable General Equilibrium Modelling; Programming and Simulations, England: Palgrave Macmillan.
10
Jorli, M., Van Passel, S., Sadeghi, H., Nasseri, A., & Agheli, L. (2017). Estimating human health impacts and costs due to Iranian fossil fuel power plant emissions through the impact pathway approach. Energies, 10(12), 2136.
11
Khiabani, N. (2017). A dynamic CGE model for evaluation of energy policies: evidence from Iran. Economic Research, 21(69), 1-46 [in Persian].
12
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