A New Framework for Hegemonic Analysis of Monetary Policy: The Case of Iran


1 Department of economics University of Isfahan

2 Department of Economics, University of Isfahan Isfahan-Iran


Monetary policy rule might be helpful to avoid the problem of time inconsistency provided there is a commitment to the rule. The commitment is the ability of a government to bind future policies. However, it doesn’t include intrinsic motivations. Therefore, hegemony, which includes both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, better solves the problem of  time inconsistency. In this paper, we explain the nature of hegemony and discuss why hegemony is preferred to commitment. We have used an index of hegemony to evaluate monetary policy and estimate the hegemony of Supervisory Packages on Monetary Policy (SPMP) of Islamic Republic of Iran for the period 2008-2011 by using fuzzy logic. The results show that an optimal hegemonic policy is better than the optimal commitment policy if and only if adjusted total effect of intrinsic motivation on an agreed-upon social objective function is positive. The results show that the hegemony index of central bank which consists of a combination of three sub-indexes such as "regional equity", "commitment ordering" and "diversity of economic activities" is relatively low and needs to be increased to ensure economic stability.


Article Title [Persian]

یک چارچوب جدید برای تحلیل هژمونیک سیاست پولی: مورد مطالعه ایران

Authors [Persian]

  • ایمان باستانی فر 1
  • محمد واعظ برزانی 2
1 بخش اقتصاد دانشگاه اصفهان
2 دانشیار گروه اقتصاد، دانشکده علوم اداری و اقتصاد، دانشگاه اصفهان
Abstract [Persian]

قاعده سیاست پولی از بروز مساله‌ی ناسازگاری زمانی جلوگیری می‌کند. اما قاعده باید تعهد‌آور باشد. تعهد، توانایی یک دولت در الزام آوربودن سیاست در آینده است. اما در تعهد، به انگیزه‌های درونی توجه نمی‌شود. بنابراین، هژمونی که دربردارنده‌ی انگیزه‌های درونی و بیرونی است، به عنوان راه کاری بهتر از تعهد در حل مساله ناسازگاری زمانی پیشنهاد می‌شود. در این مقاله، ماهیت هژمونی بیان و در خصوص بهتر بودن هژمونی از تعهد  استدلال می‌شود. همچنین یک شاخص کمی جهت برآورد هژمونی بسته‌های سیاستی نظارتی بانک مرکزی جمهوری اسلامی ایران طی سال‌های 1388تا 1391، بر اساس منطق فازی ارایه می‌گردد. نتایج گویای آن است که یک سیاست بهینه هژمون بهتر از یک سیاست تعهدآور بهینه است اگر و تنها اگر اثر تعدیل شده‌ی تغییر در انگیزه‌های درون‌زا نسبت به تغییرات رفاهی مثبت گردد. همچنین، نتایج نشان می‌دهد که به منظور هرگونه سیاست ثبات اقتصادی، شاخص هژمونی بانک مرکزی جمهوری اسلامی ایران که ترکیبی از سه شاخص عدالت منطقه‌ای، قوانین دستوری و تنوع فعالیت‌های اقتصادی است باید افزایش یابد.

Keywords [Persian]

  • هژمونی
  • سیاست پولی تعهدآور
  • منطق فازی
  • ایران
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