Iran's Strategy in Utilizing Common Resources of Oil and Gas: Game Theory Approach

Document Type: Research Paper


Department of Economics, Urmia University, Urmia, Iran.


Utilization management of Persian Gulf oil and gas reserves is important, because of the importance of this area owing to the fact that it comprised 60% of the proven oil reserves and 40% of the proven gas reserves of the world and it determines the world's oil and gas strategies. By using game theory, this paper seeks to achieve the best strategy that Iran could use in confronting other partners of common fields. Moreover, it seems to find the best approach for Iran and other countries in cooperation and non-cooperation conditions in extraction. The results showed that the higher the number of countries for a common resource, the less the attempt of each country would be; however, the more the total attempt of countries will be, which means more waste of attempt. Overall, partner countries in a resource are recommended to take actions to extract common resource via agreement and mutual cooperation; so that they could extract the same amount of common resources exercising less effort.


Article Title [Persian]

راهبرد ایران در بهره برداری از منابع مشترک نفت و گاز: رویکرد نظریه بازی

Authors [Persian]

  • صلاح سلیمیان
  • کیومرث شهبازی
گروه اقتصاد، دانشگاه ارومیه، ارومیه، ایران.
Abstract [Persian]

مدیریت بهره برداری از ذخایر نفت و گاز خلیج فارس به دلیل اهمیت بسیار بالای این منطقه که حدود 60 درصد ذخایر اثبات شده نفت و 40 درصد ذخایر اثبات شده گاز جهان را داراست و استراتژی های نفت و گاز جهان را رقم خواهد زد، بسیار حیاتی است. این مقاله با بهره گیری از نظریه بازی به دنبال دست یابی به بهترین استراتژی است که ایران می تواند در مواجهه با سایر شرکای میادین مشترک، داشته باشد و همچنین در دو حالت همکاری و عدم همکاری در استخراج، بهترین استراتژی برای ایران و سایر کشورها چه خواهد بود. نتایج نشان داد که در صورت همکاری بین کشورها با سطح تلاش کمتری می توان همان اندازه از منابع را استخراج کرد که در صورت عدم همکاری بین کشورها اتفاق می افتاد. همچنین هر چه تعداد کشورها برای یک منبع مشترک، بیشتر باشد، سطح تلاش هر کشور کمتر خواهد بود اما سطح تلاش مجموع کشورها بیشتر خواهد شد، یعنی میزان تلاش بیشتری هدر می رود. نهایتاً پیشنهاد می گردد که کشورهای شریک در یک منبع با عقد موافقت نامه، با همکاری متقابل به استخراج منابع مشترک بپردازند، تا با میزان کمتری از تلاش بتوانند همان مقادیر از منابع مشترک را استخراج کنند.

Keywords [Persian]

  • نظریه بازی
  • بازی های ایستا با اطلاعات کامل
  • منابع مشترک نفت و گاز

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