Document Type : Research Paper
Authors
1 Department of Economics, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran.
2 Department of Economics, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran.
3 Faculty of Theology and Ahl-al-Bayt (Prophet’s Descendants), University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran.
Abstract
The economy is full of opportunities through which individuals have to decide under different rules. Modeling individuals' behaviors under these additional rules are pursued in experimental economics. The present paper addresses some of the critical institutional questions in governance in the Iranian economy, using experimental economics. The data were collected and created out of 480 simulation runs of joint pool resource harvesting where resource users had asymmetric power for harvesting the resource. Alternative institutional arrangements, each representing different governance of natural resources, were simulated in these experiments. This paper concentrates on the three factors of harvesters' communication, the origin of regulations (the harvesters or the government), and rule enforcement (the amount and probability of violators' fines). The results indicate that in the situations where participants are allowed to regulate, harvesting the natural resource is equal to where the government is in charge of regulating. For an external regulation, the worst way to harvest it is when the government fails to guarantee the rule enforcement (the probability of a fine is low). Under such circumstances, resource harvesting is even more unequal than the open-access state. Exogenous regulation leads to crowding-out altruistic motivations.
Keywords
Main Subjects
Article Title [Persian]
اثر ترتیبات نهادی متفاوت بر آزمایشات آبیاری با وجود عدم تقارن قدرت
Authors [Persian]
- ملیحه پورعلی 1
- هادی امیری 2
- وحید مقدم 3
- علیرضا کمالیان 2
1 گروه اقتصاد، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران.
2 گروه اقتصاد، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران.
3 دانشکده اهل بیت، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران.
Abstract [Persian]
اقتصاد مملو از موقعیت‌هایی است که افراد مجبورند تحت قواعد متفاوت تصمیم‌گیری کنند. مدلسازی رفتار افراد تحت این قواعد متفاوت در شاخه اقتصاد آزمایشگاهی دنبال می‌شود. مقاله حاضر با بهره‌گیری از اقتصاد آزمایشگاهی به چند پرسش مهم نهادی اقتصاد ایران در حوزه حکمرانی پرداخته است. داده‌های تحقیق از اجرای 480 دور شبیه سازی بهره‌برداری از یک منبع مشترک در شرایطی که بهره‌برداران در برداشت از منبع، قدرت نامتقارن داشته‌اند، ایجاد شده است. ترتیبات نهادی بدیل که هر یک بازنمایی از حکمرانی متفاوت منابع طبیعی است، در این آزمایشهای تجربی شبیه سازی شده است. در این مقاله تمرکز روی سه عامل ارتباط بهره‌بردارن، منشاء قاعده‌گذاری (خود بهره‌برداران یا دولت) و ضمانت اجرای قواعد (میزان و احتمال جریمه خاطیان) بوده است. نتایج نشان می‌دهد در شرایطی که به بهره‌برداران امکان قاعده‌گذاری داده شود، بهره‌برداری از منبع طبیعی برابرتر از حالتی است که قاعده‌گذاری به دولت سپرده شود. در حالت قاعده‌گذاری برونزا، بدترین شیوه بهره‌برداری حالتی است که دولت نتواند ضمانت اجرای قواعد را تأمین کند (احتمال جریمه کم باشد). در این شرایط بهره‌برداری از منبع حتی از حالت بدون قاعده (دسترسی باز) نابرابرتر است. قاعده‌گذاری برونزا به کمرنگ شدن انگیزه‌های نوع دوستانه می‌انجامد.
Keywords [Persian]
- ترتیبات نهادی
- اقتصاد آزمایشگاهی
- منبع مشترک
- قاعده گذاری
- عدم تقارن قدرت
the commons. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 76,
51-66.
Al-Muhammad, S., MalekMohammadi, B., Yavari, A. R., & Yazdanpanah, M.
(2016). An analysis of the resilience of water resources in the governance
process of the Iranian Plateau. Journal of Strategy, 81, 145-176.
Anderies, J. M., & Janssen, M. A. (2013). Environmental variability and
collective action: Experimental insights from an irrigation game. Ecological
Economics. 93(sep), 166-176.
Anderies, J. M., & Janssen, M. A. (2016). Explaining success and failure in the
commons: The configurable nature of Ostrom’s institutional design
principles. International Journal of the Commons, 10(2), 417-439.
Azkia, M., & Rostamalizadeh, V. (2014). Social aspects of the irrigation system
in Iran. Journal of Anthropological Studies, 21, 11-43.
Bayat, P., Saboohi Sobouni, M., Keikha, A. A., Ahmadpour Borazjani, M., &
Karami, E. (2015). The concept of water institution and a view of the
experience of water institution reforms in other countries. Journal of
Strategic and Macro Policies, 11, 115-138.
Bayat, P., Sobouhi Sabuni, M., Keikha, A. A., Ahmadpour Borazjani, M., &
Karami, E. (2016). Effectiveness and reform of existing laws and its impact
on the performance of the water sector: Application of route analysis. Journal
of Agricultural Economics and Development, 95, 167-190.
Beaumont, B. A. (1971). Qanat system in Iran. Hydrological Sciences Journal,
16(1), 39-50.
Beckenkamp, M., & Ostmann, A. (1999). Missing the target? Sanctioning as an
ambiguous structural solution. In Resolving Social Dilemmas, Edited by M.
Foddy, M. Smithson, S. Schneider, and M. Hogg. Philadelphia, PA:
Psychology Press.
Bicchieri, C. (2002). Covenants without swords: Group identity, norms and
communication in social dilemmas. Rationality and Society, 14(2), 192-228.
Cai, J., & Xiong, H. (2017). An agent-based simulation of cooperation in the use
of irrigation systems. Complex Adaptive Systems Modeling, 5(9), 17-47.
Chaudhuri, A. (2011). Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods
experiments: A selective survey of literature. Experimental Economics,
14(1), 47-83.
Cardenas, J. C., Stranlund, J., & Willis, C. (2000). Local environmental control
and institutional crowding-out. Journal of World Development, 28(10),
1719-1733.
Cardenas, J. C., Johnson, N., & Rodriguez, L. A. (2015). Vertical collective action
addressing vertical asymmetries in watershed management. Documentos
CEDE.
456 Pourali et al., Iranian Journal of Economic Studies, 9(2) 2020, 437-458
Camerer, C. F., & Fehr, E. (2001). Cooperation, reciprocity and punishment in
fifteen small-scale societies. American Economic Review, 91(2), 73-78.
Camerer, C. F. (2003). Strategizing in the brain. Science, 300(5626), 1673-1675.
Camerer, C. F., & Fehr, E. (2006). When does “economic man” dominate social
behavior? Science, 311, 47-52.
Cassari, M., & Plott, C. R. (2003). Decentralized management of common
property resources: Experiments with a centuries-old institution. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 51, 217-247.
Farzaneh, M. R., Bagheri, A., & Momeni, F. (2016). Analysis of the institutional
basis of groundwater resources system in Rafsanjan, Iran. Journal of Water
Resources Research, 2, 67-82.
Farzaneh, M. R., Bagheri, A., & Ramezani Ghavamabadi, M. H. (2017).
Institutional foundations of crisis in groundwater management in Iran.
Journal of Economic Research, 64, 57-94.
Hosseini Abri, S. H. (1998). Traditional management of Zayandehrud water
debate in Iranian indigenous knowledge. Quarterly Journal of the Faculty of
Literature and Humanities (University of Isfahan), 15, 101-112.
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000). Cooperation and punishment in public goods
experiments. The American Economic Review, 90, 980-994.
Glockner, A., Kube, S., & Nicklisch, A. (2018). The joint benefits of observed
and unobserved social sanctions. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental
Economics, 75.
Hackett, C. S. (1994). The role of communication in resolving commons
dilemmas: Experimental evidence with heterogeneous appropriators. Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management, 27(2), 99-126.
Hunt, R. C. (1988). Size and structure of authority in canal irrigation systems.
Journal of Anthropological Research. 44(4), 335-355.
Jafari, S. A. (2004). Water market approach and its requirements. Journal of
Agricultural Economics and Development, 48, 75-104.
Jannsen, M. A., Holahan, R., Lee, A., & Ostrom, E. (2010). Lab experiments for
the study of social-ecological systems. Science, 328, 613-617.
Janssen, M. A. (2010). Introducing ecological dynamics into common-pool
resource experiments. Ecology and Society, 15(2), 7.
Janssen, M. A., Anderies, J. M., & Cardenas, J. C. (2011). Head-enders as
stationary bandits in asymmetric commons: Comparing irrigation
experiments in the laboratory and the field. Journal of Ecological Economics,
70(9), 1590-1598.
Janssen, M. A., Bousquet, F., Cardenas, J. C., Castillo, D., & Worrapimphong, R.
(2012). Field experiments on irrigation dilemmas. Agricultural Systems, 12,
65-75.
Janssen, M. A., & Rollins, N. D. (2012). Evolution of cooperation in asymmetric
commons dilemmas. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 81,
220-229.
Pourali et al., Iranian Journal of Economic Studies, 9(2) 2020, 437-458 457
Koukoumelis, A. M., Vittoria, L., & Johannes, W. (2009). Leading by words: A
voluntary contribution experiment with one-way communication. Jena
Economic Research Papers, 2009, 106 .
Lansing, J. S. (1991). Priests and programmers: Technologies of power in the
engineered landscape of Bali. Princeton University Press.
Lansing, J. S., & Miller, J. H. (2005). Cooperation games and ecological
feedback: Some insights from Bali. Current Anthropology, 46 (2), 328-334.
Ledyard, O. (1995). Public goods: Some experimental results. In J. Kagel & A.
Roth (Eds.), Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton: Princeton
University Press (Chap. 2).
Motevasseli, M., & Hosseini, S. J. (2015). An institutional analysis of property
rights policy in the Iranian oil industry. Journal of Energy Economics
Studies, 46, 1-25.
Mohammadi Kangrani, H., & Rafsanjani Nejad, S. (2015). A Study of the power
structure in the water policy and management network in the fourth
development plan of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Journal of Public Policy,
3, 121-138.
Müller, A., & Vickers, M. (1996). Communication in a common pool resource
environment with probalistic destruction. Conference Paper, Public Choice
Society Meetings, April 12-14. Houston, TX.
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for
collective action. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Ostrom, E., Walker, J., & Gardner, R. (1992). Covenants with and without a
sword: Self-governance is possible. Journal of American Political Science
Review, 86(2).
Ostrom, E., & Gardner, R. (1993). Coping with asymmetries in the commons:
Self-governing irrigation systems can work. J. Econ. Perspect, 7(4), 93-112.
Ostrom, E., Gardner, R., & Walker, J. (1994). Rules, games, and common-pool
resources. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
Ostrom, E. (2000). Collective action and the evolution of social norms. Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 14(3), 137-158.
Ostrom, E. (2006). The value-added of laboratory experiments for the study of
institutions and common-pool resources. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, 61, 149-163.
Ostrom, E. (2010). Analyzing collective action. Agricultural Economics, 41, 155-
166.
Olson, M. (1993). Dictatorship, democracy, and development. American Political
717Science Review, 87, 567-576.
Olson, M. L. (2000). Power and prosperity: Outgrowing communist and capitalist
dictatorships. Oxford University Press.
Otto, I. M., & Wechsung, F. (2014). The effects of rules and communication in a
behavioral irrigation experiment with power asymmetries carried out in north
china. Ecological Economics, 99, 10-20.
458 Pourali et al., Iranian Journal of Economic Studies, 9(2) 2020, 437-458
Palouch, M., & BaniAsadi, M. (2018). Developing a model of appropriate
institutional arrangements for integrated water resources management.
Journal of Agricultural Economics and Development, 103, 239-272.
Sally, D. (1995). Conversation and cooperation in social dilemmas: A metaanalysis of experiments from 1958 to 1992. Rationality and Society, 7(1), 58-
92.
Vallino, E. (2014). The tragedy of the park: An agent-based model of endogenous
and exogenous institutions for forest management, Ecology and society. 19
(1), 35.
Velez, M. A., Murphy, J. J., & Stranlund, J. K. (2010). Centralized and
decentralized management of local common resources in the developing
world: Experimental evidence from fishing communities in Colombia.
Economic Inquiry, 48(2), 254-265.
Wittfogel, K. A. (2013). Oriental despotism: A comparative study of total power.
Mohsen Thalasi (Trans.), Tehran: Sales Publication (1957).
)