Institutional Economics
Zahra Kheiridoust; Farshad Momeni; Amir khadem Alizadeh; Bahareh Nasiri
Abstract
Cultural, social, and economic changes are closely correlated, however, understanding such a relationship requires a theoretical model. The current paper has provided a conceptual model for explaining the relationship between culture and economy. Some economists consider culture as resistant to change ...
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Cultural, social, and economic changes are closely correlated, however, understanding such a relationship requires a theoretical model. The current paper has provided a conceptual model for explaining the relationship between culture and economy. Some economists consider culture as resistant to change and some others consider it very flexible. Moreover, some consider cultural values as universal and some as specific to societies. The purpose of this paper is to outline the relationship between these theories and provide a model for the complicated relationship between culture and economic development and understand cultural stabilization and changes. The main question is why some societies are incapable of expanding universal values. We applied conceptual discourse analysis. The analyses are performed in the "new institutional economics" framework. Three issues were discussed: First of all the speed and orientation of cultural changes, then the process of socialization and cultural transfer. The relation between culture and formal institutions and also the Hobbesian problem are the last issues covered in this paper to build a model of cultural stabilization and change in a developing economy.
Institutional Economics
Maliheh Pourali; Hadi Amiri; Vahid Moghadam; Alireza Kamalian
Abstract
The economy is full of opportunities through which individuals have to decide under different rules. Modeling individuals' behaviors under these additional rules are pursued in experimental economics. The present paper addresses some of the critical institutional questions in governance in the Iranian ...
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The economy is full of opportunities through which individuals have to decide under different rules. Modeling individuals' behaviors under these additional rules are pursued in experimental economics. The present paper addresses some of the critical institutional questions in governance in the Iranian economy, using experimental economics. The data were collected and created out of 480 simulation runs of joint pool resource harvesting where resource users had asymmetric power for harvesting the resource. Alternative institutional arrangements, each representing different governance of natural resources, were simulated in these experiments. This paper concentrates on the three factors of harvesters' communication, the origin of regulations (the harvesters or the government), and rule enforcement (the amount and probability of violators' fines). The results indicate that in the situations where participants are allowed to regulate, harvesting the natural resource is equal to where the government is in charge of regulating. For an external regulation, the worst way to harvest it is when the government fails to guarantee the rule enforcement (the probability of a fine is low). Under such circumstances, resource harvesting is even more unequal than the open-access state. Exogenous regulation leads to crowding-out altruistic motivations.
Institutional Economics
Mohamad Mahdi Kamal; Hadi Amiri; Vahid Moghadam; Darrius Rahimi
Abstract
The Dictator Game can describe many environmental challenges. That is the conditions where exploiters have asymmetric power in exploitation. For solving such environmental problems, solutions have been proposed, several of which focus on exogenous factors and others on characteristics of users. In this ...
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The Dictator Game can describe many environmental challenges. That is the conditions where exploiters have asymmetric power in exploitation. For solving such environmental problems, solutions have been proposed, several of which focus on exogenous factors and others on characteristics of users. In this research, we are looking for a solution to one of these problems in the field of water for Iranian exploiters. To do this, we used experimental economics in the context of institutional analysis and development framework. The game was played in 19 groups of 5 participants with 1767 observations and then estimated using an econometrics model. This study showed that creating a club good downstream of the river and supporting local regulation (along with intra-system monitoring) can enable water distribution to occur more uniformly among users. Additionally, supporting local regulation has more substantial effects than the creation of club goods in water distribution. Furthermore, the data analysis obtained through the experiment and Ring Game shows that if the upstream exploiters have an other-regarding social value orientation, it produces positive effects on the exploit of other people so that the downstream exploiters also benefit from water. Thus, this research can have some implications for solving Iran's environmental problems similar to the dictator game.
