International Economics
Mirreza Fazelian; Khadije Nasrollahi; Hadi Amiri
Abstract
Abstract:The purpose of this research is to criticize the Iranian governments’ policies supporting the Foreign Direct Investors. In this regard, 243 questionnaires have been distributed among actual investors (active in the country) and 107 questionnaires among potential ones; by collecting and ...
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Abstract:The purpose of this research is to criticize the Iranian governments’ policies supporting the Foreign Direct Investors. In this regard, 243 questionnaires have been distributed among actual investors (active in the country) and 107 questionnaires among potential ones; by collecting and applying Heckman two-step model, we analyzed them. Uusing Heckman two-step model was necessary because factors influencing potential investors’ behaviors to come or not to Iran were not necessarily the same as the factors influencing the amount of investment inflows by actual investors. Accordingly, in this article, the soft dimension of business environment (encompassing incertitude due to Political Instability, Xenophobia, ...) is differentiated from its hard dimension (encompassing Bureaucratic Environment, Government Executive Inability, ...) which can influance on the way that these dimensions impact on investor’s behavior. The results indicate that while in deciding to come to Iran, the investors only consider the soft dimension and its decisive importance, policy making in the field of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI ) are concentrated only on hard dimensions of the matter. For investors, deciding to enter Iran, the soft dimension is important to them, not the hard dimension, but after entering the country, hard dimensions also becomes important, so that if the country's status is suitable in terms of hard dimensions, actual investors will be more motivated to develop their business and bring more capital in to the country. Improperly prioritizes issues that the investors face, can be one of the failure factors of current policy making to attract real investors.
Institutional Economics
Maliheh Pourali; Hadi Amiri; Vahid Moghadam; Alireza Kamalian
Abstract
The economy is full of opportunities through which individuals have to decide under different rules. Modeling individuals' behaviors under these additional rules are pursued in experimental economics. The present paper addresses some of the critical institutional questions in governance in the Iranian ...
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The economy is full of opportunities through which individuals have to decide under different rules. Modeling individuals' behaviors under these additional rules are pursued in experimental economics. The present paper addresses some of the critical institutional questions in governance in the Iranian economy, using experimental economics. The data were collected and created out of 480 simulation runs of joint pool resource harvesting where resource users had asymmetric power for harvesting the resource. Alternative institutional arrangements, each representing different governance of natural resources, were simulated in these experiments. This paper concentrates on the three factors of harvesters' communication, the origin of regulations (the harvesters or the government), and rule enforcement (the amount and probability of violators' fines). The results indicate that in the situations where participants are allowed to regulate, harvesting the natural resource is equal to where the government is in charge of regulating. For an external regulation, the worst way to harvest it is when the government fails to guarantee the rule enforcement (the probability of a fine is low). Under such circumstances, resource harvesting is even more unequal than the open-access state. Exogenous regulation leads to crowding-out altruistic motivations.
Econometrics
Alireza Kamalian; Seyed Komail Tayebi; Alimorad Sharifi; Hadi Amiri
Abstract
Propensity score matching is extensively utilized in estimating the effects of policy interventions and programs for data observations. This method compares two treatment and control groups to make statistical inferences about the significance of the effects of these policies on target variables. Therefore, ...
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Propensity score matching is extensively utilized in estimating the effects of policy interventions and programs for data observations. This method compares two treatment and control groups to make statistical inferences about the significance of the effects of these policies on target variables. Therefore, when using propensity score matching, it is significant to obtain the standard error to estimate the treatment effect. The precise estimations of variance and standard deviation facilitate more efficient statistical testing and more accurate confidence intervals. However, there is no agreement in the literature on the estimation method of standard error; some methods rely on resampling, while others do not. This study compares these methods using Monte Carlo simulation and calculating the Mean Squared Errors (MSE) of these estimators. Our results indicate that Jackknife and standard methods are superior to Abadie and Imbens (2006) bootstrap, and subsampling ones in terms of accuracy. Finally, reviewing Tayyebi et al. (2019) indicated that different methods of estimating variance in the matching estimator led to different statistical inferences in terms of statistical significance.
