Mansour Mahinizadeh; Kazem Yavari; Hassan Valibeigi; Ali Shafiei
Abstract
Nowadays, banks are considered as one of the major components of the financial system of a country and any deficits and malfunction in the banking system will negatively affect the performance of the real sector. Therefore, there is a need for more investigation on the behavior of banks and factors affecting ...
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Nowadays, banks are considered as one of the major components of the financial system of a country and any deficits and malfunction in the banking system will negatively affect the performance of the real sector. Therefore, there is a need for more investigation on the behavior of banks and factors affecting those behaviors in a country. One of the issues that affect the behavior of banks is symmetric information. Thus, the main aim of the present study was to investigate the impact of asymmetric information in the money markets on investment, production, and employment. Hence, based on the New-Keynesian framework, a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model was adopted in accordance with the structure of the economy of Iran. The designed model entailed nine sectors including households, firms, banks, the Central Bank, oil, the government, exports, imports, and other countries of the world. Moreover, the rigidities of the prices and wages, and the rigidities of the imported and exported goods were taken into account in the model. By using the Bayesian method and data gathered from Iran during 1974-2017, the parameters of equations were estimated and the impact of symmetric information was investigated. The results indicated that increasing the asymmetric information and reducing the honesty in the society through decreasing the resources available to the banks and increasing the cost of banks will lead to an increase in the profit of the facilities. Also, increasing the profit of banks concessional loans decreases investment, production, and employment.
Morteza Derakhshan; MirHadi Hosseini Kondelaji
Abstract
This article aims to study lease and hiring contract in the Iranian-Islamic setting and analyze the asymmetric information problem in these contracts. For doing this, we study the characteristics of lease and hiring contracts in Iran (real world experimental characteristics that recognized in other studies), ...
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This article aims to study lease and hiring contract in the Iranian-Islamic setting and analyze the asymmetric information problem in these contracts. For doing this, we study the characteristics of lease and hiring contracts in Iran (real world experimental characteristics that recognized in other studies), using library method, then we mathematically model different aspects of asymmetric information (hidden information and hidden action) using contract theory. The result of model indicates that there is a list of optimal contracts in any lease or hiring transactions that can solve asymmetric information problems (adverse selection and moral hazard) by satisfying the participation and incentive compatibility constraints. Finally in the experimental analyses we calculate the optimal contract with hypothetical parameters using lingo software and illustrate that the main models provided for every transactions is solvable and the optimal contracts are obtainable. Experimental contracts shows that the lessor has to set security deposits of tenant type θL lower than tenant type θH and set higher monthly rent for him in lease contracts, and principal has to set wage of tenant type θL lower than tenant type θH and set higher length of contract for him in hiring contracts to solve asymmetric information problems.
