Expanding the Cournot Competition Model Considering Sanctions and Resource Share

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Department of Economics, Urmia University, Urmia, Iran.

2 Faculty of Economics, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran.

Abstract

One of the most important problems in the exploitation of shared natural resources is the difference in the parties' shares, the energy source, the type of technology used in resource exploitation, ensuring the necessary capital for extraction and field development, and so on. In exploiting shared natural resources, it is not possible to simply rely on the principle of national sovereignty and unilaterally engage in the exploitation of these resources. Rational exploitation and joint development can only be effective if the issue of defining boundaries has been resolved. One of the most existing models in the field of exploiting shared natural resources is the Cournot Competition model, but this model is designed based on simple assumptions. This study applies game theory to modify the classical Cournot competition model. A more comprehensive framework is developed by incorporating critical variables specifically, each country's resource share and the impact of sanctions. The results indicate that each country's extraction capacity is directly related to its share of the shared resource and inversely related to the sanction factor. Additionally, each country's "best response" function is not only a function of the level of extraction and total supply (b) and extraction costs but also a function of the interested parties' share of the shared resource and their extraction capacity.

Keywords

Main Subjects

Article Title [Persian]

بسط مدل رقابت کورنو با در نظر گرفتن تحریم ها و سهم منابع

Authors [Persian]

  • صلاح سلیمیان 1
  • سیاب ممی پور 2
  • ستار سلیمیان 2
1 دانشکده اقتصاد، دانشگاه ارومیه، ارومیه، ایران.
2 دانشکده اقتصاد دانشگاه خوارزمی، تهران، ایران.
Abstract [Persian]

یکی از مهم‌ترین چالش‌ها در بهره‌برداری از منابع طبیعی مشترک، تفاوت در سهم طرفین، منبع انرژی، نوع فناوری مورد استفاده در استخراج منابع، تأمین سرمایه لازم برای استخراج و توسعه میادین، و مواردی از این دست است. در بهره‌برداری از منابع طبیعی مشترک، نمی‌توان صرفا به اصل حاکمیت ملی تکیه کرد و به‌صورت یک‌جانبه اقدام به استخراج این منابع نمود. بهره‌برداری عقلانی و توسعه مشترک تنها زمانی می‌تواند مؤثر واقع شود که مسئله تعیین مرزها حل‌وفصل شده باشد. یکی از رایج‌ترین مدل‌های موجود در زمینه بهره‌برداری از منابع طبیعی مشترک، مدل رقابت کورنو است، اما این مدل بر پایه فرضیات ساده‌سازی‌شده طراحی شده است. این مطالعه از نظریه بازی‌ها برای اصلاح مدل کلاسیک رقابت کورنو بهره می‌گیرد. یک چارچوب جامع‌تر با ادغام متغیرهای اساسی، به‌ویژه سهم منابع هر کشور و تأثیر تحریم‌ها، توسعه داده شده است. نتایج نشان می‌دهد که ظرفیت استخراج هر کشور با سهم آن از منبع مشترک رابطه‌ای مستقیم دارد و با عامل تحریم رابطه‌ای معکوس دارد. علاوه بر این، تابع «بهترین واکنش» هر کشور نه‌تنها تابعی از سطح استخراج، عرضه کل (b) و هزینه‌های استخراج است، بلکه تابعی از سهم طرف‌های ذی‌نفع از منبع مشترک و ظرفیت استخراج آن‌ها نیز می‌باشد.

Keywords [Persian]

  • نظریه بازی ها
  • تعادل نش
  • مدل رقابت کورنو
  • منابع طبیعی مشترک
  • تحریم ها

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History

  • Receive Date: 16 January 2025
  • Revise Date: 16 May 2025
  • Accept Date: 16 May 2025

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