Analyzing and Extending the Capital Market Line: Implications for International Trade

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Department of Management and Economics, Islamic Azad University, Oloom Tahghighat Branch, Tehran, Iran.

2 Department of Accounting, Islamic Azad University, Boroojerd Branch, Lorestan, Iran.

Abstract

This paper extends the classical Capital Market Line (CML) framework by incorporating strategic interactions between international investors and host countries through a game-theoretic model. The extended model introduces key behavioral and institutional variables, notably the degree of hostility (ρ), economic power asymmetry, and relative risk-return dynamics across domestic and foreign markets. The investor seeks optimal capital allocation based on expected return and perceived risk, while the host country aims to retain capital by enhancing domestic market attractiveness and minimizing political hostility. The equilibrium analysis shows that the investor’s decision is highly sensitive to relative returns and external risk, while the host country’s utility is most affected by the degree of hostility and its relative economic power. The results confirm that minimizing political antagonism and enhancing institutional cooperation significantly increases domestic utility and stabilizes capital inflows. Ultimately, this paper provides a more realistic and dynamic interpretation of the CML by integrating macro-financial and geopolitical dimensions, and it suggests that peaceful economic diplomacy and sound macroeconomic policies are crucial for sustainable investment and trade flows.

Keywords

Main Subjects

Article Title [Persian]

تحلیل و بسط خط بازار سرمایه: پیامدهایی برای تجارت بین‌الملل

Authors [Persian]

  • آرش اعظمی 1
  • محمود همت فر 2
  • مریم خلیلی عراقی 1
1 دانشکده مدیریت و اقتصاد، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، واحد علوم تحقیقات، تهران، ایران.
2 دانشکده حسابداری، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، واحد بروجرد، لرستان، ایران.
Abstract [Persian]

این مقاله با در نظر گرفتن تعاملات استراتژیک بین سرمایه‌گذاران بین‌المللی و کشورهای میزبان از طریق یک مدل نظریه بازی­ها، چارچوب کلاسیک خط بازار سرمایه (CML) را گسترش می‌دهد. مدل توسعه‌یافته، متغیرهای کلیدی رفتاری و نهادی، به‌ویژه درجه خصومت (ρ)، عدم تقارن قدرت اقتصادی و پویایی نسبی ریسک-بازده در بازارهای داخلی و خارجی را معرفی می‌کند. سرمایه‌گذار به دنبال تخصیص بهینه سرمایه بر اساس بازده مورد انتظار و ریسک درک شده است، در حالی که کشور میزبان با افزایش جذابیت بازار داخلی و به حداقل رساندن خصومت سیاسی، به دنبال حفظ سرمایه در داخل است. تحلیل نقطه تعادل نشان می‌دهد که تصمیم سرمایه‌گذار کاملاً به بازده نسبی و ریسک بازار خارجی حساس است، در حالی که مطلوبیت کشور میزبان از درجه خصومت و قدرت اقتصادی نسبی آن بیشترین تأثیر را می‌پذیرد. نتایج تأیید می‌کند که به حداقل رساندن خصومت سیاسی و افزایش همکاری نهادی، مطلوبیت داخلی را به طور قابل توجهی افزایش داده و جریان‌های ورودی سرمایه را تثبیت می‌کند. در نهایت، این مقاله با ادغام ابعاد کلان مالی و ژئوپلیتیکی، تفسیری واقع‌بینانه‌تر و پویاتر از CML ارائه می‌دهد و نشان می‌دهد که دیپلماسی اقتصادی مسالمت‌آمیز و سیاست‌های کلان اقتصادی مناسب برای سرمایه‌گذاری پایدار و جریان‌های تجاری بسیار مهم هستند.

Keywords [Persian]

  • نظریه بازی‌ها
  • تعادل نش
  • سرمایه‌گذاری بین‌المللی
  • درجه خصومت

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History

  • Receive Date: 03 October 2025
  • Revise Date: 25 October 2025
  • Accept Date: 26 October 2025

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